The Roulette Farm: The Panorama View

Earlier this month, we looked at the terrain of the Mumma farm from a panorama view. Today, we will look at the Roulette farm; primarily, we will be focusing on the approach of French and Richardon's divisions in their assault on the Sunken Road. For those who didn't read the previous post, please check it out at the link above. It goes hand in hand with today's post.

This panorama shot shows the ground over which men of William French's and Israel Richardson's divisions advanced on the morning of September 17, 1862. These two divisions had been separated from John Sedgwick's division of the Second Corps due to terrain, orders, and confusion (this is discussed more in the previous post). On the far left of the photograph, the Observation Tower on the Sunken Road can be seen. On the far right, there is the Roulette Farm. This picture was taken from one of the highest ridges on the ground over which these Federal soldiers advanced. They moved across this ground from right to left in this photograph.

 

In this version of the Ezra Carman map showing troop movements from 9 am to 9:30 am, several features are highlighted. First, the spot where the panorama was taken is noted by an orange star. The observation tower is indicated by a tall red pyramid, helping to show where the left edge of the image is located. The Roulette farm, on the right of the panorama, is circled in red. The location of the Visitor Center is circled in yellow, and the Reel Ridge in the far distance of the panorama is highlighted in light blue. Additionally, the trees along the Roulette farm lane, visible in the center of the panorama photograph, are highlighted by a green line in the map above. I thought these enhancements would help interpret the map and the photos together, especially for those who aren't terribly familiar with the terrain and location.

The reason why this photograph is so telling is it shows something vitally important about the Sunken Road attack. This terrain, like much of Antietam, is an ocean of hills, ridges, swales, and depressions. This terrain was one major reason why the killing and slaughter was so great that day. From this position, only parts of the Sunken Road can be seen, making it a hidden trench of sorts. However, Federal soldiers would have been open to artillery fire from the Piper Farm behind the Sunken Road and, more importantly, from the Reel Ridge. While the Piper Farm is hidden from view, the Reel Ridge is just under one mile away. It was covered with Confederate artillery and able to blast Union soldiers advancing on the Sunken Road. While we often discuss the view Confederate soldiers in the road had of advancing Federals, we often forget that those Federals were exposed to artillery fire throughout the assault. 

Essentially, the views for advancing soldiers were changing with every step they took. While this may seem an obvious point, it is much more relevant when considering that the lines of sight are changing, affecting the vulnerability of attacking soldiers to rifle and artillery fire.

Here are a few more specific shots of the terrain:

This picture, taken from behind the Roulette Farm, is looking toward the Sunken Road and the Observation Tower, visible in the distance. While the trees in the foreground were not present in 1862, they don't take away from what the image tells us; from this position, seeing and understanding the strength of Confederates in the road was a near impossibility due to the terrain.

 This image was taken from the same vantage point as the panorama photograph, and is looking toward the Roullette farm (the right side of the panorama)

 This image was also taken at the same point as the panorama. It is looking toward the hill on which the visitor center currently sits.

This image, taken from the spot of Graham's battery, is near the site of the previous two pictures. It shows how close they were to the Observation Tower. 

Image of the view Graham's battery would have had in responding to Confederate fire on the Piper Farm (invisible from this spot due to terrain) and the barely visible Reel Ridge in the distance.

A better image showing that most of the Sunken Road is barely visible from this spot. In the distance is Reel Ridge, which was covered by Confederate artillery pieces firing into the ranks of oncoming Union soldiers in French's and Richardson's divisions.

The Mumma Farm: The Panorama View

This past Saturday morning I spent a few hours hiking with friend and Antietam Guide Jim Rosebrock (Jim runs the South from the North Woods and Antietam Voices blogs). Jim is a good friend of mine with whom I have spent many hours talking about various Antietam and Civil War topics, especially those aspects of Antietam that are either overlooked or misinterpreted by most historians.

On Saturday, Jim and I decided to do some hiking and cover the approaches to the Sunken Road to get a better perspective of what Union soldiers faced in making the assault. It was a very worthwhile exercise.


I was able to take panorama pictures at two points with my smart phone. These pictures really emphasize some of the terrain features, which I took pictures of with my camera for more detail.

The points we focused on were the Mumma and Roulette farms. In order to understand why and how Federal forces attacked the Sunken Road, the terrain of these two farmsteads is crucial. This is the first of several posts looking at some of the terrain of the fight for Bloody Lane. Today we will look at the Mumma Farm, and next up will be the Roulette Farm.


The first point where we stopped to survey the land was just north of the Mumma Farm and Cemetery, and just south of the East Woods.This spot was roughly where the advance of the 2nd Corps split into two entirely separate sections.

For those familiar with the battle, the first division from the Second Corps to arrive on the field that day was John Sedgwick's Second Division. Sedgwick's force was led by Second Corps commander Edwin Sumner himself. Sumner led this force into the East Woods, and then continued due west into the West Woods where Sedgwick's men were hit by a massive flank attack. This was highly problematic for William French's Third Division of the Second Corps. When French arrived on the field, he could not see where Sedgwick had gone; instead, because of terrain and orders telling him to turn left, French turned south and moved toward the Confederate position at the Sunken Road. Further complicating matters was the 12 Corps division of George Greene. Greene's men had advanced south from the East Woods and occupied the plateau near the Dunker Church. Because Greene was on Sedgwick's flank, French had to go further south and east, again forcing him toward the Sunken Road.



In this first picture, you can see Elk Ridge on the far left of the photograph. In the center, down below the ridge line, you can see the Mumma Barn and you can barely make out part of the Mumma House. Slighty further right is the Mumma Cemetery. On the far right is the southern edge of the East Woods and the Smoketown Ridge (referring to the ridge where the Smoketown Road runs).

Why is this important? Well, this photograph tells us several things.


First, look at the ridge lines. On the right, the Smoketown Ridge completely separates this part of the field from the Cornfield/East Woods/North Woods/West Woods. Essentially, because of this ridge, the route of Sedgwick's division toward the West Woods is completely invisible. This made things very confusing and complicated for French's division.

Second, look at how low the Mumma Farm sits. Not only is this location divided from the Cornfield by the Smoketown Ridge, but the terrain slopes downward from the Smoketown Ridge.
as French began to turn toward the Sunken Road, the downward slope of the land led him into a series of ridges that completely divide the center of the field from the northern part.


Third, while you can't see anything north or west of the East Woods, French would have had a good vantage point to see where Greene's division was located. If you look past the Mumma Cemetery and the trees on the Mumma Farm, you can make out the hill on which the New York State Monument and the Visitor Center both sit. This was roughly the location of Greene's division as French arrived on the field.

Fourth, look at the left side of the photograph. On the left you can tell that the terrain over which the Federal attackers were traversing was vastly different. Not only was it separated by the ridge lines described above, but it was divided by intermittent steams, making the terrain very rough and divided. Jim and I hiked through it and it was tough enough for the two of us to not get lost with our maps and knowledge of the field. Just imagine how confusing it was for Union soldiers who had never been there before. While some officers had maps, certainly enlisted soldiers and low ranking officers were without terrain maps. Making matters worse, 7 of French's 10 regiments were green troops, further complicating the Federal advance.

Here are a few detailed pictures highlighting parts of the panorama picture.

This picture, showing the far right of the panorama, shows the Smoketown Road along the Smoketown Ridge. As was noted, despite the Cornfield and West Woods being just on the other side of this ridge, they are completely invisible. 

Slightly further left on the panorama, the Mumma Cemetery is prominently seen. To the left of the cemetery, in the distance, is the hill on which the Visitor Center sits. This was roughly the position of Greene's division.

A wider shot of the Mumma Cemetery and Mumma Barn. As was noted, the Barn and House sit lower on the ridge as it fades to the south. In between the cemetery and barn is the ridge which Greene's division occupied that morning.

Slightly further left on the panorama shot, the Mumma Barn and the ground for French's assault on the Sunken Road.

This is something which did not show up at all on the panorma picture. From the spot where it was taken, behind the Mumma Barn, there is a clear line of sight all the way to the National Cemetery in Sharpsburg. This hill, Cemetery Hill, offered Lee and other Confederates a great vantage point to observe the battle.

I have edited one of the Ezra Carmen maps to better illustrate these points and relate troop movements to the pictures above.

The orange star on the map is the position from which the panorama picture was taken. The picture was taken going from west to south (right to left on the panorama). The left pointing arrow reflects the direction of John Sedgwick's division's advance. This advance cannot be seen in the photograph because of the Smoketown Ridge, which is highlighted with a red line along the route of the Smoketown Road. The downward pointing arrow indicates the direction which French's men took toward the Sunken Road. Thus, the left pointing arrow reflects the far right edge of the photograph (although not visible due to terrain) and the downward arrow is the far left of the picture (hopefully that isn't too confusing to follow).

Because the Mumma farm is so prominent on this terrain, I circled it in red on the map below. The Mumma farm, sitting on a downward slope, was a dividing point between the fighting for the East Woods and the fight for the Sunken Road. The map and panoramic pictures clearly show this. Everything north of the farm was moving west, and everything east of the farm was moving south.

I have also highlighted each of the three Union divisions on the map by underlining them in yellow. While Sedgwick's men were in the West Woods (scattered units underlined in yellow), French's men were advancing on the Sunken Road (yellow line next to the downward arrow). In between these two divisions was that of George Greene (also in yellow, located near the Mumma Farm, circled in red).

Below is the second of the panorama photographs from the Mumma Farm. It is very similar to the first, but I took two just to make sure that at least one turned out well.

Hopefully this helps to make some sense of the terrain around the Mumma Farmstead. It is fascinating to use pictures and maps to understand how this ground affected the troop movements on September 17, 1862. Ultimately, there is no better way to understand how these battles were fought than to get out on the ground and walk the terrain for yourself.

Edwin V. Sumner to his wife, September 20, 1862: "I think I was never in such a fire as when that division broke"

Here is another recent find from my research in various collections in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress. The below is the transcript of a letter which Major General Edwin V. Sumner, commander of the Second Corps of the Army of the Potomac at Antietam, to his wife three days after Antietam. It is very candid and informal, and he relays his thoughts on the recent battle, as well as Union strategy going forward from Antietam.

My own dear Wife,

The battle is over and we are safe. The enemy has fled from Maryland and I do not think we shall meet them again for some time, for it will take a little time to make preparations before we pursue them. It was a terrific battle. Some generals under my command were wounded. Mansfield was killed early in the action. He had only had command of his Corps two days, that corps (Banks) is under my command and in addition to my own. I did not like the way in which the troops were put into battle. They went in corps after corps instead of being all forward in battle array before we engaged.

On the right Hooker went [forward], and then my second corps under Mansfield and then my own corps. The consequence was that we were not strong enough—Sedgwick was wounded and his division broke and never did I have to make such exertion as I did to rally that division. I succeeded finally and got them again into line and held my position.

The enemy fought like maniacs to give you an idea of it. Nineteen of their men lay dead about a piece of artillery that one of my batteries knocked to pieces.—Two of my staff were wounded. Col. Revere and young (illegible). They have both gone home.

Our dear boy behaved splendidly. He was much more anxious about me than about himself—he was as cool and manly as an old veteran.

Col. Revere left before he knew the fate of his brother the doctor, he was shot through the heart and killed instantly, but it was not known till the next day. I have sent his remains home in charge of an officer. The battle has been unequally fatal to officers, and especially to those of high command. I think I was never in such a fire as when that division broke—I was obliged to shout in such a way that I could not speak loud for some time afterwards—We have been on the field ever since the battle but today I have got the command a little more comfortably fixed, and we are all enjoying the rest.

I don’t know what their plans will be—I think everything we can raise should be pushed upon them at once and grind them to powder—If there should be a pause in the operations I will come home, dear, and rest for I do feel that I need your care and love.

Fatherly love to all

Dear father,

E

(Sumner Family Papers, Box 1, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division)

This letter fascinates me on many different levels. First off, it is a personal note from Sumner to his wife just after the battle, relaying to her his private thoughts on the fighting at Antietam. Seeing his descriptions of his son's conduct in battle is particularly interesting in this regard. For Sumner, escaping combat unscathed was not just about him, but about his son as well. His closing lines about hoping to come home soon for her love and care are particularly moving as well.

In regards to the battle itself, Sumner's letter adds some colorful descriptions of the fighting involving Sedgwick's division in the West Woods. By describing how loud he was yelling when trying to rally the men, the letter provides an excellent personal account of what the West Woods fight was like for the 2nd Corps commander that morning. When over 7,000 Confederate slammed into Sedgwick's left flank, the route was on, and it was all Sumner could do to save himself and attempt to salvage what was left of the division he had led so confidently into the woods just a few moments before.
Also, his comment objecting to the piecemeal manner in which troops were committed that day holds true to his reported impatience on the morning of the 17th. While the 1st and 12th Corps were plunging into battle, Sumner was still at McClellan's headquarters awaiting his go ahead to take his corps across the creek.

Sumner's comments regarding the necessary time it would take to regather the army after the battle are illuminating as well. It highlights the exhausted nature of the men following the fight, something which many armchair general historians too easily forget. I really like his line regarding his desire to "grind them to powder." It certainly displays his firm resolve to end the war and the rebellion sooner rather than later. 

It is also worth making a point of clarification. Sumner writes of having two corps under his command. During the advance of the Army of the Potomac from Washington, Sumner commanded the army's center wing, consisting of his 2nd Corps and the 12th Corps, formerly the 2nd Corps of the Army of Virginia, previously commanded by Nathaniel Banks (the corps formally switched its designation on September 12). The right wing consisted of the 1st and 9th Corps, and was commanded by Ambrose Burnside, and the left wing consisted of the 6th Corps and Darius Couch's 4th Corps division, and was commanded by William B. Franklin. By the time the army reached the banks of Antietam Creek, this three wing formation was all but dead: the 1st and 9th Corps were on opposite ends of the battlefield, and on the night of the 16th, the 12th Corps was sent across the creek without its 2nd Corps counterpart for the center wing. Indeed, at the start of the battle, only Franklin's wing of the army was still together, being located several miles away in Pleasant Valley. Thus, despite demise of the three wing command by the time the opening guns were firing at Antietam, Sumner was still writing as though he was still the commander of the center wing of the army (both his 2nd Corps and the 12th Corps) three days after the battle.