Sentinel Magazine, Summer 2012

As you may have noticed, I haven't been posting on the blog very frequently as of late. Between research and work at the park, I honestly haven't had much time to work on the blog. Below is a link for the summer issue of the Park Service's Sentinel magazine, highlighting the events in the National Capital Region. This issue focuses on the Maryland Campaign, and it has great pieces from rangers at other sites, as well as a schedule of events for the various parks in the region for the months of August and September, including Antietam's anniversary events this year. My friend and colleague Brian Baracz and I were fortunate enough to each write a short article on Antietam for this publication. The link below will take you to an online pdf version of the magazine. You can pick up a hard copy at Antietam, or one of the other Civil War sites in the National Capital Region of the Park Service.

On the hard copy version, my article is on pages 28 and 29. On the online pdf version, it is on page 15 of 21. It briefly discusses Antietam's link to the Emancipation Proclamation. I wanted to post this to share an awesome NPS resource dealing with the 150th anniversary of the Maryland Campaign, as well as to remind all of you that while I may not be posting as often as I would like to on here, I am still busy writing and working away at Antietam.



http://www.nps.gov/mana/parknews/upload/Summer-2012-Sentinel-interactive.pdf

11th Mississippi Monument

Very recently, Antietam gained a brand new monument, the first on the field since the 1990s. While the National Park Service has a moratorium on new monuments, this one was erected on private property, sitting just south of Cornfield Avenue, as well as the famous Cornfield itself. The monument honors the 11th Mississippi Infantry. The monument is extremely well done, very tasteful and respectful, yet artistic as well. This is one Antietam Ranger who is (unofficially of course) very pleased with the new addition to our park.


Here are a few pics of our newest monument...

The Road to Antietam, July 22, 1862: "Thenceforward, and Forever, Be Free"

150 years ago today, President Abraham Lincoln introduced to his cabinet what would become the greatest presidential act in American history. The stage was being set for the Battle of Antietam to become not only a battle for military supremacy, but to be a battle for the future of freedom in the United States.

(Library of Congress)

Throughout his political career, Abraham Lincoln was opposed to the institution of slavery. A leading member of the nascent Republican Party, Lincoln campaigned on limiting the spread of slavery; yet, there was little he could do regarding slavery on a national level for most of his political life. Whether in the Illinois State Legislature, or during his one term in the United States Congress, Lincoln lacked the power or ability to affect change on slavery in any meaningful way. Illinois was a state with extremely harsh laws limiting rights and freedoms for free blacks, and Southern Illinois was quite similar to many Southern states when it came to attitudes on race and slavery. Yet, through the power of his rhetoric, Lincoln was able to craft a convincing argument that slavery was a moral wrong that undermined the legitimacy of the United States' claim to be a republic of liberty. In his famed Peoria, Illinois address of 1854, responding to the Kansas-Nebraska Act, Lincoln proclaimed his hatred for both slavery and those who were indifferent to it: "This declared indifference, but, as I must think, covert real zeal for the spread of slavery, I can not but hate. I hate it because of the monstrous injustice of slavery itself. I hate it because it deprives our republican example of its just influence in the world."

During the seventh of his famed debates with Senator Stephen Douglas in 1858, Lincoln culminated a series of arguments by making the case for the moral injustice of slavery and tyranny. Speaking of Chief Justice Roger Taney's opinion in the Dred Scott case, Lincoln declared that if slavery was a moral wrong, which he insisted it was, then owning slaves could not be considered a natural right from God.

But if it is a wrong, he cannot say people have a right to do wrong. He says that upon the score of equality, slaves should be allowed to go in a new Territory, like other property. This is strictly logical if there is no difference between it and other property. If it and other property are equal, his argument is entirely logical. But if you insist that one is wrong and the other right, there is no use to institute a comparison between right and wrong. You may turn over every thing in the Democratic policy from beginning to end, whether in the shape it takes on the statute book, in the shape it takes in the Dred Scott decision, in the shape it takes in conversation, or the shape it takes in short maxim—like arguments—it every where carefully excludes the idea that there is any thing wrong in it. That is the real issue. That is the issue that will continue in this country when these poor tongues of Judge Douglas and myself shall be silent. It is the eternal struggle between these two principles—right and wrong—throughout the world. They are the two principles that have stood face to face from the beginning of time; and will ever continue to struggle. The one is the common right of humanity and the other the divine right of kings. It is the same principle in whatever shape it develops itself. It is the same spirit that says, "You work and toil and earn bread, and I’ll eat it." No matter in what shape it comes, whether from the mouth of a king who seeks to bestride the people of his own nation and live by the fruit of their labor, or from one race of men as an apology for enslaving another race, it is the same tyrannical principle.

Four years after these debates, in 1862, Lincoln was the President of the United States, guiding the nation through a fiery trial of war, deciding whether the country would live or die. He was no longer a Congressman from Illinois; he was now the president, and thus, had more power to deal with the issue of slavery. Yet, under the Constitution, he was still limited in what he could do. As the casualties mounted, Lincoln sought a way to not only gain something of a military advantage, but to make a broader statement about the war itself. Lincoln could have stopped the bloodshed at any moment by simply allowing the Confederacy to go its separate way. Yet, he maintained the war, believing deeper issues to be at stake. He clearly saw a link between death on the battlefield and life for the nation; it was not enough for lives to be sacrificed just so that the country could continue on as it once was, a nation marred by the injustice of slavery, an institution rooted in moral wrong. For Lincoln, this bloodshed needed to lead to "a new birth of freedom."



On July 13, 1862, while on his way to a funeral for the son of Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, Lincoln struck up a conversation regarding the possibility of bringing emancipation into the Civil War with several of his cabinet members. Various Union generals had been dealing with slaves through martial edicts and policies, but these generally only applied to specific localities. Lincoln also found fault with them because, as he believed, such policy needed to be set at the national level so as to make sure it was in accordance with constitutional law and the policy of his administration. Congress had acted against slavery in other ways as well, passing the First Confiscation Act in 1861, and the Second Confiscation Act in July of 1862. These were meant to deal with those slaves who made their way to Federal lines, making it legal for commanders to bring them in and treat them like contraband property being seized in a war. Yet, on this summer morning carriage ride to a funeral, Lincoln stressed several times that a possible Emancipation Proclamation might be needed as a military necessity to turn the war around, inspiring the Union war effort with new life. Those officials who rode with Lincoln that July morning were not the only ones who sensed that the president was on the verge of a history altering policy. On July 20, 1862, one of Lincoln's private secretaries, John Hay, wrote in a letter, “… he will not conserve slavery much longer. When next he speaks in relation to this defiant and ungrateful villainy it will be with no uncertain sound.”



Two days after Hay wrote those words, Lincoln gathered his cabinet on July 22, 1862, 150 years ago today, to introduce a proclamation of emancipation, using his executive authority to free slaves in those states then in rebellion against the Federal government. As Lincoln later explained, "I said to the Cabinet that I had resolved upon this step, and had not called them together to ask their advice, but to lay the subject-matter of a proclamation before them." The rough draft document he introduced that day is as follows, and can be found in the Library of Congress:

In pursuance of the sixth section of the act of congress entitled “An act to suppress insurrection and to punish treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate property of rebels, and for other purposes” Approved July 17, 1862, and which act, and the Joint Resolution explanatory thereof, are herewith published, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, do hereby proclaim to, and warn all persons within the contemplation of said sixth section to cease participating in, aiding, countenancing, or abetting the existing rebellion, or any rebellion against the government of the United States, and to return to their proper allegiance to the United States, on pain of the forfeitures and seizures, as within and by said sixth section provided.

And I hereby make known that it is my purpose, upon the next meeting of congress, to again recommend the adoption of a practical measure for tendering pecuniary aid to the free choice or rejection, of any and all States which may then be recognizing and practically sustaining the authority of the United States, and which may then have voluntarily adopted, or thereafter may voluntarily adopt, gradual abolishment of slavery within such State or States—that the object is to practically restore, thenceforward to be maintain[ed], the constitutional relation between the general government, and each, and all the states, wherein that relation is now suspended, or disturbed; and that, for this object, the war, as it has been will be, prosecuted. And, as a fit and necessary military measure for effecting this object, I, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, do order and declare that on the first day of January in the year of Our Lord one thousand, eight hundred and sixty three, all persons held as slaves within any state or states, wherein the constitutional authority of the United States shall not then be practically recognized, submitted to, and maintained, shall then, thenceforward, and forever, be free.

The statement began by referencing the recently passed Second Confiscation Act, which required an executive action for it to begin taking effect. That act provided for the seizure of property belonging to those in active rebellion against the Federal government. Lincoln at first believed that with that executive action, he would issue his proclamation, and the above text was designed to that purpose. Essentially, Lincoln at first believed this was a measure which would be issued within days, not months.

He began his second paragraph by referencing his attempts to bring about compensated emancipation, a plan aimed at pursuing the abolition of slavery while maintaining political support for his administration and the war in the Border States. This plan was a tough sell, as it not only would have cost a great deal, but was politically risky in many of these areas. He also included language that would apply such compensated emancipation to those states in rebellion, perhaps as an olive branch to bring about both and end to the fighting and pushing towards the abolition of slavery in a peaceful manner.

Lastly, in the above section italicized (done by me), Lincoln declared his intention to issue a military order under his power as Commander in Chief declaring all slaves in those states in rebellion on January 1, 1863, to "then, thenceforward, and forever, be free." In both of the Confiscation Acts, Congress had essentially declared that because of the war, Federal forces could legally seize Confederate property, including slaves. Now, Lincoln was going one step further. Under his authority as Commander in Chief, he was using his war powers to declare that all slaves held as Southern property (using Southern slavery arguments claiming that slaves were indeed property against slave owners) would be freed. This measure not only had obvious moral benefits of hammering at the foundations of slavery, but would provide a practical benefit of weakening the Southern power structure by removing a significant labor force, hurting the South politically, economically, and socially.


With those words, Lincoln effectively introduced the widest ranging executive measure in American history. The reaction of his Cabinet was somewhat mixed. Attorney General Edward Bates and Secretary of the Treasury Salmon Chase were the first to speak, and each was supportive, although Chase questioned the effectiveness of the measure, suggesting it could lead to retaliatory actions against slaves throughout the South. Montgomery Blair, the Postmaster General, objected to the proclamation, believing it would have a negative effect and cost Lincoln significant support in the fall Congressional elections.

It was Secretary of State William Seward, a long standing opponent of slavery, who offered the most significant comments in response to the proclamation. Believing that recent military setbacks on the Peninsula and in the Shenandoah Valley had a strong effect on the North, Seward reasoned, “The depression of the public mind, consequent upon our repeated reverses, is so great that I fear the effect of so important a step.” Thus, Seward suggested that issuing the proclamation following a string of defeats would smack of desperation, depriving the measure of its full impact. As Seward also argued, "It may be viewed as the last measure of an exhausted government, a cry for help...." It would be best, Seward noted, to wait for a Federal victory, only issuing the document once Lincoln could "give it to the country supported by military success" (Allen Guelzo, Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation, 130-137).

While Lincoln began by announcing his intention to issue the proclamation one way or another, he never said anything about timing. Based on this cabinet meeting, as well as on a visit from Seward and Republican Thurlow Weed that evening, Lincoln decided that waiting for a victory was the best course of action. It would be a wait much longer than he ever intended. During his wait, thousands more would be added to the death toll of the war. Lincoln himself began to question God's purpose in the conflict. By September of 1862, Lincoln saw his opportunity to finally issue his proclamation. He would later explain that when Lee's army crossed the Potomac River to begin the Maryland Campaign, Lincoln made a promise to himself and to God that should the Confederate army be turned back, he would have the victory he needed to issue the Emancipation Proclamation.

On September 17, 1862, the Battle of Antietam would not just be fought as a military contest; it would be fought as a contest between the forces of freedom and slavery, determining the future of each in the United States. The stage was set for all of this 150 years ago today, on July 22, 1862.

Edwin V. Sumner to his wife, September 20, 1862: "I think I was never in such a fire as when that division broke"

Here is another recent find from my research in various collections in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress. The below is the transcript of a letter which Major General Edwin V. Sumner, commander of the Second Corps of the Army of the Potomac at Antietam, to his wife three days after Antietam. It is very candid and informal, and he relays his thoughts on the recent battle, as well as Union strategy going forward from Antietam.

My own dear Wife,

The battle is over and we are safe. The enemy has fled from Maryland and I do not think we shall meet them again for some time, for it will take a little time to make preparations before we pursue them. It was a terrific battle. Some generals under my command were wounded. Mansfield was killed early in the action. He had only had command of his Corps two days, that corps (Banks) is under my command and in addition to my own. I did not like the way in which the troops were put into battle. They went in corps after corps instead of being all forward in battle array before we engaged.

On the right Hooker went [forward], and then my second corps under Mansfield and then my own corps. The consequence was that we were not strong enough—Sedgwick was wounded and his division broke and never did I have to make such exertion as I did to rally that division. I succeeded finally and got them again into line and held my position.

The enemy fought like maniacs to give you an idea of it. Nineteen of their men lay dead about a piece of artillery that one of my batteries knocked to pieces.—Two of my staff were wounded. Col. Revere and young (illegible). They have both gone home.

Our dear boy behaved splendidly. He was much more anxious about me than about himself—he was as cool and manly as an old veteran.

Col. Revere left before he knew the fate of his brother the doctor, he was shot through the heart and killed instantly, but it was not known till the next day. I have sent his remains home in charge of an officer. The battle has been unequally fatal to officers, and especially to those of high command. I think I was never in such a fire as when that division broke—I was obliged to shout in such a way that I could not speak loud for some time afterwards—We have been on the field ever since the battle but today I have got the command a little more comfortably fixed, and we are all enjoying the rest.

I don’t know what their plans will be—I think everything we can raise should be pushed upon them at once and grind them to powder—If there should be a pause in the operations I will come home, dear, and rest for I do feel that I need your care and love.

Fatherly love to all

Dear father,

E

(Sumner Family Papers, Box 1, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division)

This letter fascinates me on many different levels. First off, it is a personal note from Sumner to his wife just after the battle, relaying to her his private thoughts on the fighting at Antietam. Seeing his descriptions of his son's conduct in battle is particularly interesting in this regard. For Sumner, escaping combat unscathed was not just about him, but about his son as well. His closing lines about hoping to come home soon for her love and care are particularly moving as well.

In regards to the battle itself, Sumner's letter adds some colorful descriptions of the fighting involving Sedgwick's division in the West Woods. By describing how loud he was yelling when trying to rally the men, the letter provides an excellent personal account of what the West Woods fight was like for the 2nd Corps commander that morning. When over 7,000 Confederate slammed into Sedgwick's left flank, the route was on, and it was all Sumner could do to save himself and attempt to salvage what was left of the division he had led so confidently into the woods just a few moments before.
Also, his comment objecting to the piecemeal manner in which troops were committed that day holds true to his reported impatience on the morning of the 17th. While the 1st and 12th Corps were plunging into battle, Sumner was still at McClellan's headquarters awaiting his go ahead to take his corps across the creek.

Sumner's comments regarding the necessary time it would take to regather the army after the battle are illuminating as well. It highlights the exhausted nature of the men following the fight, something which many armchair general historians too easily forget. I really like his line regarding his desire to "grind them to powder." It certainly displays his firm resolve to end the war and the rebellion sooner rather than later. 

It is also worth making a point of clarification. Sumner writes of having two corps under his command. During the advance of the Army of the Potomac from Washington, Sumner commanded the army's center wing, consisting of his 2nd Corps and the 12th Corps, formerly the 2nd Corps of the Army of Virginia, previously commanded by Nathaniel Banks (the corps formally switched its designation on September 12). The right wing consisted of the 1st and 9th Corps, and was commanded by Ambrose Burnside, and the left wing consisted of the 6th Corps and Darius Couch's 4th Corps division, and was commanded by William B. Franklin. By the time the army reached the banks of Antietam Creek, this three wing formation was all but dead: the 1st and 9th Corps were on opposite ends of the battlefield, and on the night of the 16th, the 12th Corps was sent across the creek without its 2nd Corps counterpart for the center wing. Indeed, at the start of the battle, only Franklin's wing of the army was still together, being located several miles away in Pleasant Valley. Thus, despite demise of the three wing command by the time the opening guns were firing at Antietam, Sumner was still writing as though he was still the commander of the center wing of the army (both his 2nd Corps and the 12th Corps) three days after the battle.

"Yes, around comes July and soon will come the honored Fourth."

On July 4, 1864, Federal forces under the command of Major General William Tecumseh Sherman were engaged in a slogging match with Joe Johnston's Confederate Army of Tennessee north of Atlanta. For weeks, Sherman had been pressing southward toward Atlanta, one of the South's most strategically important cities. For every move Sherman made, Johnston would retreat deeper and deeper into the heart of Georgia. By mid-June, however, the Federal advance had slowed to a crawl. On June 27, frustrated and hoping to break the stalemate, Sherman launched an aggressive assault against Confederate positions on and around Kennesaw Mountain, leading to the most severe fighting and bloodletting of the Atlanta Campaign. The Federal assaults were thrown back by firm Confederate defensive lines, resulting in more trenches and stalemate. Yet by July 2, Confederate forces began falling back yet again toward Atlanta, as a result of another Federal flanking maneuver. In the midst of all this, Private Albert Champlin of the 105th Ohio Volunteer Infantry was fastidiously recording his impressions of these events in his diary. During the first days of July, 1864, Champlin was looking forward to the Fourth of July, understanding that, because of the bloody struggle encompassing the nation, that historic day was even more significant. July 4, 1776 was the day in which America declared its independence from Great Britain, as Abraham Lincoln said in his Gettysburg Address, based on "the proposition that all men are created equal." In 1864, in the midst of a struggle "testing whether that nation, or any nation so conceived and so dedicated can long endure," remembering the nation's birth and its promise for a better future was one of the things which helped Private Albert Champlin to carry on in the midst of the long, bloody, and brutal march toward Atlanta during what would be in many ways the pivotal campaign of the American Civil War.




 

July 1, Friday—“Yes, around comes July and soon will come the honored Fourth. What will be the events thereof? Will they be similar to those of a year ago? [Referring to Federal victories at Gettysburg and Vickburg on July 3 and 4, 1863] At least may God grant that the present great work of our country and nation may continue to advance successfully to the end of putting down treason and rebellion and with them may their enormous parent evils and iniquities be annihilated, and may the time thus come when soldiers can return to civil vocations under Free Government and that even improved.”

July 2, Saturday—artillery firing back and forth

July 3, Sunday—Sherman having again pushed his flanks around those of the enemy, thus compelling them again to evacuate a truly strong hold or do worse by remaining, which Joe Johnson don’t choose to do. Troops are on the move as early as sunrise but our division moves at about 9 AM, bivouacking that night 5 miles south of Marietta, rebels retreated nearly to the river… Thus again Sunday passes, the enemy having again taken it as their day for retreat. They are reported as making another stand this side of the [Chattahoochee] River.

July 4, Monday—Champlin writes of artillery firing on Confederates that morning. Private Champlin and others of the 105th Ohio were sent to Marrieta as a garrison, where they learned of an “extensive and successful charge including part of the 14^th Corps made upon the enemies' works, the works carried, many prisoners taken, also considerable artillery besides the rebels loss being heavy in killed and wounded. Number of our killed and wounded not yet reported but must be considerable, our troops being the attacking party. Thankful should be be to Divine Providence that our ever honored and memorable National Birthday is thus made the more sacred by a victory over the Nation’s and Freedom’s enemies.”

Albert Champlin's Diary can be found in the Alfred Mewett Papers Collection at the Western Reserve Historical Society in Cleveland, Ohio

Captain George A. Custer to Major General George B. McClellan, September 15, 1862

Over the past few weeks, on days when I am not working at the park, you can most likely find me in Washington, at either the National Archives or the Library of Congress, digging through rolls of microfilm and dusty old record books, working away on my ongoing research regarding the strength, experience, and composition of the Army of the Potomac at Antietam. The McClellan Papers at the Library of Congress have turned out to be very, very interesting. While Stephen Sears published a collection of McClellan's Civil War correspondence years ago, the collection only scratches the surface of what can be found in the Library of Congress holdings. Thus far, I have mostly been digging through rolls and rolls of correspondence on microfilm, primarily things that were sent to McClellan before and during the campaign. Some of this material can be found in the Official Record volumes relating to Antietam (and the supplemental volume as well). Yet, much of it is unpublished reports and dispatches. For an excellent example, I have below a dispatch sent to McClellan by a young Captain by the name of George Armstrong Custer (sound familiar?) Custer was serving on McClellan's staff during the Maryland Campaign, and on September 15, the day after the Battle of South Mountain, Custer sent a message to McClellan describing for him Lee's positions outside of Sharpsburg. The time on this dispatch appears to be 1 p.m., meaning that this message is a firsthand account of Lee's battle lines by Custer, who was apparently one of the first Union officers to survey the positions along Antietam Creek.

The enemy is drawn up in line of battle on a ridge about two miles beyond Potomac [.] They are in full view [.] Their line is a perfect one about a mile and a half long. We have can have equally good position as they now occupy. Richardson is forming his line to attack. We are lacking in artillery Tidball’s being the only artillery available hurry up more guns we can get good position for two hundred guns. Longstreet is in command and has forty cannon that we know of. We can employ all the troops you can send us.
Custer

Library of Congress, George B. McClellan Papers (A80: Roll 32)

In the McClellan Papers, this dispatch is dated September 17, 1862. Yet, because of its content and the other dispatches which Custer sent McClellan that day (at least from those I saw in the McClellan Papers thus far), this must have been on the 15th, and whomever cataloged the papers simply mislabeled it. The mention of Tidball's Battery, Richardson's Division, and the defensive positions of Lee's army outside of Sharpsburg all suggest that this was a dispatch sent on the 15th, making it an early assessment of the Confederate position outside of Sharpsburg.


In the Sears collection of McClellan's Civil War correspondence, a reference is made to this dispatch in a footnote where Sears only included the following portion: "The enemy is drawn up in line of battle on a ridge about two miles beyond [Keedysville]. They are in full view. Their line is a perfect one about a mile and a half long.... Longstreet is in command and has forty cannon that we know of." Sears omitted the lines where Custer notes the lack of Federal artillery at the front, as well as the mention of Tidball’s battery and Richardson’s division. It should be noted that, while Custer's dispatch clearly says Lee is two miles beyond the Potomac, he was either mistaken or confused in his wording. As Sears indicated in his reference to this dispatch, Custer meant that Lee was two miles beyond Keedysville, not the Potomac River. On the 15th, Lee was indeed two miles beyond Keedysville, drawn up outside of Sharpsburg. If Custer did indeed mean the Potomac, then using beyond was a poor word choice, as it suggests that Lee's army was past the river, rather than a few miles away from it, still on Maryland soil. However, given the lack of punctuation and the hurried nature of the writing, I doubt Custer took a moment to proofread the message he was sending along. Either way, it is a fascinating dispatch from an officer who would go on to be one of the more famous generals of the war, and of the 19th century, offering one of the first Union assessments of Lee’s position outside of Sharpsburg. 

Private George Cramer, 11th Pennsylvania Infantry

Over the next few weeks, I hope to start posting parts of letters that I am coming across in the course of my research. Today, I would like to share a few lines from several letters written by Private George Cramer of the 11th Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry. These typed transcripts of letters were donated by Private Cramer's descendants, and can be found in the 11th Pennsylvania Infantry file in the Antietam National Battlefield library. Private Cramer became ill just before the Battle of South Mountain, and was thus not directly engaged on either the 14th or 17th of September. His letters mention this, referring to South Mountain as the battle fought on Sunday, and Antietam as being fought on Wednesday. His letters give a sense of the exhausted nature of the men, as well as the attrition that the campaign was taking on them. I have italicized one section in the letter of the 21st to highlight those portions which display the effect the campaign was having on the strength of the 11th Pennsylvania. Not only do these letters describe attrition by sickness and casualties, they show that soldiers such as George Cramer firmly understood the stakes of the Maryland Campaign.

September 21^st, 1862

Dear Wife,

I have no doubt that you are all anxiety and trouble about me, and disappointed in not getting a letter from me before this, but I assure you it was impossible for me to write to you before this. Since receiving your last, we have been pushed forward where we met the enemy on the mountain between Frederick and Hagerstown, the details of it you will have received through the newspapers which are nowise exaggerated. In my last letter, if you received it, I stated that I have not been well since we left Hall’s Hill, Virginia, and I had not got better all along. On Sunday evening this day last week, forcing the mountain, I was forced to leave ranks and sank down at a tree. It just commenced getting dark, the battle raging furious. I rested for a while and then walked down where our brigade had left its knapsacks. George Righter I met there, sick like myself. We have been together ever since, both almost unable to walk. But this day we came up to our brigade and many a face is missing among us. General Harsuff [sic] is seriously wounded. Colenel [sic] R. Coulter commands the brigade. Captain Kuhn took sick on the march. When we came to Frederick he was compelled to leave the company and go to the hospital. Lieutenant Noble is also in some hospital. Maybe he was taken back to Washington. He took sick before the Bull Run fight, but still tried to stick it out and fought hard at that fight which I believe done him no good. He still kept on and kept with regiment coming from Virginia on to Washington but somewhere between Washington and Frederick he was compelled to stay back. I suppose his people know his whereabouts. Our company has neither captain, lieutenant, nor any sergant [sic], only corporals to command us. We have but one captain in our regiment. The rest is killed, wounded, or back sick. Our Lieutenant colonel got killed at Bull Run. Also our Major was wounded so we have but one field officer in the regiment, and his attention is more required to the brigade now than he can pay to our regiment since Hartsuff is wounded. So you can see we are in a bad trim.

…

These battles which have been fought here in Maryland will bring sorrow to a great many families as the loss on both sides was heavy. If only God would have mercy on the nation and put a stay to this bloodshed. He has protected me so far and can further if his will.

I must close short with my best wishes to all friends,

And my sincere love to you and Maney.

Yours

George Cramer

September 29, 1862

…

Dear Mary, no doubt you are more anxious to hear how I’m getting along than about anything else. Since we’re laying here resting I got quite well and begin to pick up fast. Of course I’m weak yet and it would set hard if there should a forward movement be made, which I hope will not be for a while, for the authorities can’t be blind to the fact that the old army is a set of men wore down almost unfit for service at present. It is true they fought the last battles (there was but a few regiments in the last actual fight), and were victorious too, but they fought with the last desperation to stop an invading foe from advancing on to their own fireside, and the same time to make good again that most shamefull [sic] defeat of Bull Run which was not caused by the want of bravery by the men, but by the ill management, yes, sometimes it is thought through treachery, of some of our generals.

…

Hurrah for the Militia that stopped the Rebels! But us poor fellows had to fight them and many a brave fellow had to bite dust and thousands to be crippled for life. But their will is a credit to them.

...