Letter to Henry Hunt, September 22, 1862

Here is another interesting letter concerning Antietam. I found this in the Henry Hunt Papers at the Library of Congress during my research last summer, and now that I have more time for transcribing in the dead of winter, I am finally getting around to it. It is a letter from a family friend to Colonel Henry Jackson Hunt, the artillery commander for the Army of the Potomac at the Battle of Antietam. Hunt took his post just a week or so before the battle, and he had a monumental task of taking count of all of the army's artillery pieces. In the Hunt papers, there is a report dated September 10, 1862, listing every battery and how many guns it had, as well as their type. It is quite impressive, and a must see for anyone interested in artillery at Antietam. Much of Hunt's work was used in the book Artillery Hell, the go to guide for artillery at the Battle of Antietam.


I don't know much about the individual who sent this letter, other than the author's family was friends with Hunt and his family. The writer seems to be a McClellan sympathizer, and to have something against the New York Tribune. I find his comments on Burnside's role at Antietam particularly interesting, although it appears that the letter writer was working with an incomplete or inaccurate understanding of what happened at the battle.  Burnside was not outnumbered, and his attack was more than simply a feint against the Confederate right. If anyone knows more about this individual, who goes only by the initials and name B.F. Craig, please post in the comments section below. I would love to learn more about this letter and its writer.

Anyways, this is a neat letter and an interesting read. Hope you enjoy.

Washington

Sept 22^nd 1862

Dear Colonel

I received yours of the 17^th with the accompanying document. If copies of it are plenty I would like two or three to send to friends who took an interest in those matters and in your career. If you have any objection to its find its way to the newspaper press you can tell me so.

I see that the NY Tribune has got up an account of the battle, which, I think, is designed for mischievous purposes, and which is getting a good deal of circulation. In case that you should not have seen it, I send you a copy with a certain part marked, in which insinuation against McClellan and Burnside are craftily made.

As far as I can gather from the newspaper account, the course of the battle was as follows. Our troops were massed against the Rebel left and centre, while Burnside with a small force occupied the attention of their right wing by a vigorous demonstration or feint, which was carried out as a false attack should be, and attained its object. The attacks in other parts of the field were successful, after severe fighting, and the enemy was dislodged from his position.

Gen. Burnside’s part would seem to have been the most difficult of any having to fight an inferior against a superior force, and credit is due to him, rather than to those who were successful by point of superior numbers.

If these facts are so, both McClellan and Burnside need righting before the public, who should be put on their guard against giving ear to the crafty malice of the Tribune.

I see that the Rebels have made a stand on the south side of the Potomac. I hope that before you cross you will have received reinforcements, which will make victory certain.

We are all well. Father has gone to St. Louis to serve on a Court Martial.

I have heard nothing from Boston since my last letter to you.

Yours Truly,

B.F. Craig

To Col. H.J. Hunt, Ch’f of Artillery of Army of Pot & Vir

Henry Jackson Hunt Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division

Edwin V. Sumner to his wife, September 20, 1862: "I think I was never in such a fire as when that division broke"

Here is another recent find from my research in various collections in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress. The below is the transcript of a letter which Major General Edwin V. Sumner, commander of the Second Corps of the Army of the Potomac at Antietam, to his wife three days after Antietam. It is very candid and informal, and he relays his thoughts on the recent battle, as well as Union strategy going forward from Antietam.

My own dear Wife,

The battle is over and we are safe. The enemy has fled from Maryland and I do not think we shall meet them again for some time, for it will take a little time to make preparations before we pursue them. It was a terrific battle. Some generals under my command were wounded. Mansfield was killed early in the action. He had only had command of his Corps two days, that corps (Banks) is under my command and in addition to my own. I did not like the way in which the troops were put into battle. They went in corps after corps instead of being all forward in battle array before we engaged.

On the right Hooker went [forward], and then my second corps under Mansfield and then my own corps. The consequence was that we were not strong enough—Sedgwick was wounded and his division broke and never did I have to make such exertion as I did to rally that division. I succeeded finally and got them again into line and held my position.

The enemy fought like maniacs to give you an idea of it. Nineteen of their men lay dead about a piece of artillery that one of my batteries knocked to pieces.—Two of my staff were wounded. Col. Revere and young (illegible). They have both gone home.

Our dear boy behaved splendidly. He was much more anxious about me than about himself—he was as cool and manly as an old veteran.

Col. Revere left before he knew the fate of his brother the doctor, he was shot through the heart and killed instantly, but it was not known till the next day. I have sent his remains home in charge of an officer. The battle has been unequally fatal to officers, and especially to those of high command. I think I was never in such a fire as when that division broke—I was obliged to shout in such a way that I could not speak loud for some time afterwards—We have been on the field ever since the battle but today I have got the command a little more comfortably fixed, and we are all enjoying the rest.

I don’t know what their plans will be—I think everything we can raise should be pushed upon them at once and grind them to powder—If there should be a pause in the operations I will come home, dear, and rest for I do feel that I need your care and love.

Fatherly love to all

Dear father,

E

(Sumner Family Papers, Box 1, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division)

This letter fascinates me on many different levels. First off, it is a personal note from Sumner to his wife just after the battle, relaying to her his private thoughts on the fighting at Antietam. Seeing his descriptions of his son's conduct in battle is particularly interesting in this regard. For Sumner, escaping combat unscathed was not just about him, but about his son as well. His closing lines about hoping to come home soon for her love and care are particularly moving as well.

In regards to the battle itself, Sumner's letter adds some colorful descriptions of the fighting involving Sedgwick's division in the West Woods. By describing how loud he was yelling when trying to rally the men, the letter provides an excellent personal account of what the West Woods fight was like for the 2nd Corps commander that morning. When over 7,000 Confederate slammed into Sedgwick's left flank, the route was on, and it was all Sumner could do to save himself and attempt to salvage what was left of the division he had led so confidently into the woods just a few moments before.
Also, his comment objecting to the piecemeal manner in which troops were committed that day holds true to his reported impatience on the morning of the 17th. While the 1st and 12th Corps were plunging into battle, Sumner was still at McClellan's headquarters awaiting his go ahead to take his corps across the creek.

Sumner's comments regarding the necessary time it would take to regather the army after the battle are illuminating as well. It highlights the exhausted nature of the men following the fight, something which many armchair general historians too easily forget. I really like his line regarding his desire to "grind them to powder." It certainly displays his firm resolve to end the war and the rebellion sooner rather than later. 

It is also worth making a point of clarification. Sumner writes of having two corps under his command. During the advance of the Army of the Potomac from Washington, Sumner commanded the army's center wing, consisting of his 2nd Corps and the 12th Corps, formerly the 2nd Corps of the Army of Virginia, previously commanded by Nathaniel Banks (the corps formally switched its designation on September 12). The right wing consisted of the 1st and 9th Corps, and was commanded by Ambrose Burnside, and the left wing consisted of the 6th Corps and Darius Couch's 4th Corps division, and was commanded by William B. Franklin. By the time the army reached the banks of Antietam Creek, this three wing formation was all but dead: the 1st and 9th Corps were on opposite ends of the battlefield, and on the night of the 16th, the 12th Corps was sent across the creek without its 2nd Corps counterpart for the center wing. Indeed, at the start of the battle, only Franklin's wing of the army was still together, being located several miles away in Pleasant Valley. Thus, despite demise of the three wing command by the time the opening guns were firing at Antietam, Sumner was still writing as though he was still the commander of the center wing of the army (both his 2nd Corps and the 12th Corps) three days after the battle.

Captain George A. Custer to Major General George B. McClellan, September 15, 1862

Over the past few weeks, on days when I am not working at the park, you can most likely find me in Washington, at either the National Archives or the Library of Congress, digging through rolls of microfilm and dusty old record books, working away on my ongoing research regarding the strength, experience, and composition of the Army of the Potomac at Antietam. The McClellan Papers at the Library of Congress have turned out to be very, very interesting. While Stephen Sears published a collection of McClellan's Civil War correspondence years ago, the collection only scratches the surface of what can be found in the Library of Congress holdings. Thus far, I have mostly been digging through rolls and rolls of correspondence on microfilm, primarily things that were sent to McClellan before and during the campaign. Some of this material can be found in the Official Record volumes relating to Antietam (and the supplemental volume as well). Yet, much of it is unpublished reports and dispatches. For an excellent example, I have below a dispatch sent to McClellan by a young Captain by the name of George Armstrong Custer (sound familiar?) Custer was serving on McClellan's staff during the Maryland Campaign, and on September 15, the day after the Battle of South Mountain, Custer sent a message to McClellan describing for him Lee's positions outside of Sharpsburg. The time on this dispatch appears to be 1 p.m., meaning that this message is a firsthand account of Lee's battle lines by Custer, who was apparently one of the first Union officers to survey the positions along Antietam Creek.

The enemy is drawn up in line of battle on a ridge about two miles beyond Potomac [.] They are in full view [.] Their line is a perfect one about a mile and a half long. We have can have equally good position as they now occupy. Richardson is forming his line to attack. We are lacking in artillery Tidball’s being the only artillery available hurry up more guns we can get good position for two hundred guns. Longstreet is in command and has forty cannon that we know of. We can employ all the troops you can send us.
Custer

Library of Congress, George B. McClellan Papers (A80: Roll 32)

In the McClellan Papers, this dispatch is dated September 17, 1862. Yet, because of its content and the other dispatches which Custer sent McClellan that day (at least from those I saw in the McClellan Papers thus far), this must have been on the 15th, and whomever cataloged the papers simply mislabeled it. The mention of Tidball's Battery, Richardson's Division, and the defensive positions of Lee's army outside of Sharpsburg all suggest that this was a dispatch sent on the 15th, making it an early assessment of the Confederate position outside of Sharpsburg.


In the Sears collection of McClellan's Civil War correspondence, a reference is made to this dispatch in a footnote where Sears only included the following portion: "The enemy is drawn up in line of battle on a ridge about two miles beyond [Keedysville]. They are in full view. Their line is a perfect one about a mile and a half long.... Longstreet is in command and has forty cannon that we know of." Sears omitted the lines where Custer notes the lack of Federal artillery at the front, as well as the mention of Tidball’s battery and Richardson’s division. It should be noted that, while Custer's dispatch clearly says Lee is two miles beyond the Potomac, he was either mistaken or confused in his wording. As Sears indicated in his reference to this dispatch, Custer meant that Lee was two miles beyond Keedysville, not the Potomac River. On the 15th, Lee was indeed two miles beyond Keedysville, drawn up outside of Sharpsburg. If Custer did indeed mean the Potomac, then using beyond was a poor word choice, as it suggests that Lee's army was past the river, rather than a few miles away from it, still on Maryland soil. However, given the lack of punctuation and the hurried nature of the writing, I doubt Custer took a moment to proofread the message he was sending along. Either way, it is a fascinating dispatch from an officer who would go on to be one of the more famous generals of the war, and of the 19th century, offering one of the first Union assessments of Lee’s position outside of Sharpsburg. 

Private George Cramer, 11th Pennsylvania Infantry

Over the next few weeks, I hope to start posting parts of letters that I am coming across in the course of my research. Today, I would like to share a few lines from several letters written by Private George Cramer of the 11th Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry. These typed transcripts of letters were donated by Private Cramer's descendants, and can be found in the 11th Pennsylvania Infantry file in the Antietam National Battlefield library. Private Cramer became ill just before the Battle of South Mountain, and was thus not directly engaged on either the 14th or 17th of September. His letters mention this, referring to South Mountain as the battle fought on Sunday, and Antietam as being fought on Wednesday. His letters give a sense of the exhausted nature of the men, as well as the attrition that the campaign was taking on them. I have italicized one section in the letter of the 21st to highlight those portions which display the effect the campaign was having on the strength of the 11th Pennsylvania. Not only do these letters describe attrition by sickness and casualties, they show that soldiers such as George Cramer firmly understood the stakes of the Maryland Campaign.

September 21^st, 1862

Dear Wife,

I have no doubt that you are all anxiety and trouble about me, and disappointed in not getting a letter from me before this, but I assure you it was impossible for me to write to you before this. Since receiving your last, we have been pushed forward where we met the enemy on the mountain between Frederick and Hagerstown, the details of it you will have received through the newspapers which are nowise exaggerated. In my last letter, if you received it, I stated that I have not been well since we left Hall’s Hill, Virginia, and I had not got better all along. On Sunday evening this day last week, forcing the mountain, I was forced to leave ranks and sank down at a tree. It just commenced getting dark, the battle raging furious. I rested for a while and then walked down where our brigade had left its knapsacks. George Righter I met there, sick like myself. We have been together ever since, both almost unable to walk. But this day we came up to our brigade and many a face is missing among us. General Harsuff [sic] is seriously wounded. Colenel [sic] R. Coulter commands the brigade. Captain Kuhn took sick on the march. When we came to Frederick he was compelled to leave the company and go to the hospital. Lieutenant Noble is also in some hospital. Maybe he was taken back to Washington. He took sick before the Bull Run fight, but still tried to stick it out and fought hard at that fight which I believe done him no good. He still kept on and kept with regiment coming from Virginia on to Washington but somewhere between Washington and Frederick he was compelled to stay back. I suppose his people know his whereabouts. Our company has neither captain, lieutenant, nor any sergant [sic], only corporals to command us. We have but one captain in our regiment. The rest is killed, wounded, or back sick. Our Lieutenant colonel got killed at Bull Run. Also our Major was wounded so we have but one field officer in the regiment, and his attention is more required to the brigade now than he can pay to our regiment since Hartsuff is wounded. So you can see we are in a bad trim.

…

These battles which have been fought here in Maryland will bring sorrow to a great many families as the loss on both sides was heavy. If only God would have mercy on the nation and put a stay to this bloodshed. He has protected me so far and can further if his will.

I must close short with my best wishes to all friends,

And my sincere love to you and Maney.

Yours

George Cramer

September 29, 1862

…

Dear Mary, no doubt you are more anxious to hear how I’m getting along than about anything else. Since we’re laying here resting I got quite well and begin to pick up fast. Of course I’m weak yet and it would set hard if there should a forward movement be made, which I hope will not be for a while, for the authorities can’t be blind to the fact that the old army is a set of men wore down almost unfit for service at present. It is true they fought the last battles (there was but a few regiments in the last actual fight), and were victorious too, but they fought with the last desperation to stop an invading foe from advancing on to their own fireside, and the same time to make good again that most shamefull [sic] defeat of Bull Run which was not caused by the want of bravery by the men, but by the ill management, yes, sometimes it is thought through treachery, of some of our generals.

…

Hurrah for the Militia that stopped the Rebels! But us poor fellows had to fight them and many a brave fellow had to bite dust and thousands to be crippled for life. But their will is a credit to them.

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