Letter to Henry Hunt, September 22, 1862

Here is another interesting letter concerning Antietam. I found this in the Henry Hunt Papers at the Library of Congress during my research last summer, and now that I have more time for transcribing in the dead of winter, I am finally getting around to it. It is a letter from a family friend to Colonel Henry Jackson Hunt, the artillery commander for the Army of the Potomac at the Battle of Antietam. Hunt took his post just a week or so before the battle, and he had a monumental task of taking count of all of the army's artillery pieces. In the Hunt papers, there is a report dated September 10, 1862, listing every battery and how many guns it had, as well as their type. It is quite impressive, and a must see for anyone interested in artillery at Antietam. Much of Hunt's work was used in the book Artillery Hell, the go to guide for artillery at the Battle of Antietam.


I don't know much about the individual who sent this letter, other than the author's family was friends with Hunt and his family. The writer seems to be a McClellan sympathizer, and to have something against the New York Tribune. I find his comments on Burnside's role at Antietam particularly interesting, although it appears that the letter writer was working with an incomplete or inaccurate understanding of what happened at the battle.  Burnside was not outnumbered, and his attack was more than simply a feint against the Confederate right. If anyone knows more about this individual, who goes only by the initials and name B.F. Craig, please post in the comments section below. I would love to learn more about this letter and its writer.

Anyways, this is a neat letter and an interesting read. Hope you enjoy.

Washington

Sept 22^nd 1862

Dear Colonel

I received yours of the 17^th with the accompanying document. If copies of it are plenty I would like two or three to send to friends who took an interest in those matters and in your career. If you have any objection to its find its way to the newspaper press you can tell me so.

I see that the NY Tribune has got up an account of the battle, which, I think, is designed for mischievous purposes, and which is getting a good deal of circulation. In case that you should not have seen it, I send you a copy with a certain part marked, in which insinuation against McClellan and Burnside are craftily made.

As far as I can gather from the newspaper account, the course of the battle was as follows. Our troops were massed against the Rebel left and centre, while Burnside with a small force occupied the attention of their right wing by a vigorous demonstration or feint, which was carried out as a false attack should be, and attained its object. The attacks in other parts of the field were successful, after severe fighting, and the enemy was dislodged from his position.

Gen. Burnside’s part would seem to have been the most difficult of any having to fight an inferior against a superior force, and credit is due to him, rather than to those who were successful by point of superior numbers.

If these facts are so, both McClellan and Burnside need righting before the public, who should be put on their guard against giving ear to the crafty malice of the Tribune.

I see that the Rebels have made a stand on the south side of the Potomac. I hope that before you cross you will have received reinforcements, which will make victory certain.

We are all well. Father has gone to St. Louis to serve on a Court Martial.

I have heard nothing from Boston since my last letter to you.

Yours Truly,

B.F. Craig

To Col. H.J. Hunt, Ch’f of Artillery of Army of Pot & Vir

Henry Jackson Hunt Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division

Federal Straggling in the Maryland Campaign: Scammon's Brigade

This is an interesting find from my most recent visit to the National Archives. It is a letter from Colonel Eliakim P. Scammon, commander of the 1st Brigade of the Kanawha Division in the Maryland Campaign. After the Battle of South Mountain, when division commander Jacob Cox rose to temporary command of the Ninth Corps, Colonel Scammon rose to command the Kanawha Division, a command he retained at the Battle of Antietam several days later (making him one of many untested division commanders in the Union army at Antietam).

A major theme of my Antietam research is that the Union army saw significant straggling in Maryland, although not on the same scale as what occurred in Confederate ranks. However, actually quantifying that straggling is next to impossible because very few reports exist listing day to day strengths for regiments, brigades, divisions, or corps, outside of tri-monthly consolidated morning reports (returns for units submitted on the 10th, 20th, and 30th of each month) and monthly returns (returns for strengths of army commands submitted at the end of each month). 

This letter helps to fill in this gap in a very small way. Here, Scammon lists numbers of men who fell out of the ranks for the three regiments in his brigade on the day of September 8. He also includes those who came back to their regiments after the day's march was done, and who were present for roll call the next morning.

I find this fascinating. First, in the three regiments, 149 men straggled from the ranks on September 8, weakening the force considerably, especially because it was just one day, and based on accounts from soldiers and officers alike, straggling occurred consistently throughout the Maryland Campaign. Furthermore, a sizable number of those stragglers came back into their regiments that night. Thus, the number for each regiment was fluctuating from one evening to the next morning. One can only assume that such straggling and fluctuating numbers, such as is seen here, had some effect on the inability of regimental, brigade, division, and corps commanders to understand exactly how many effective fighting men they had under their command on any given day. 

The obvious disclaimer for this is that it only applies to one day and to one brigade. However, based on what I have found elsewhere in company books being left behind or leaving blank spaces for recording strength during the month of September, Scammon's September 9th letter seems to fit a larger trend of straggling and uncertainty in understanding Federal strength in September 1862.

 

Headquarters, 1^st Brigade, Kanawha Division

September 9, 1862

Sir,

I have the honor to report the number of absentees from “Roll Call” immediately upon entering the camp last night and the number absent from “Roll Call” this morning, in the different regiments and camps of the 1^st Brigade, as follows,

                               “Evening Roll Call”                “Morning Roll Call”

30^th Regiment               36 men                                     23 Men

12^th                                53 Men                                    10 Men

23^rd                                60 Men                                    24 Men

1^st OH Artillery

1^st Va Cavalry

                                    Total—149                             Total—57

Very Respectfully,

E.P. Scammon

Col. Commanding Brigade

 

Capt. G.M. Bascom

A.A.G.

Source: Eliakim P. Scammon dispatch of September 9, 1862, Records of U.S. Army Continental Commands, Letters Received, Entry 961, Record Group 393, Part 2, National Archives. 

"Perfect clarity of understanding..."

Because I am now in the process of getting my research from this summer published, I wanted to post a few of the letters, dispatches, and telegrams that I found during my research for the project.

The dispatch below is from the George B. McClellan Papers at the Library of Congress. It is one of the strongest examples of the chaos inflicting Union forces in and around Washington D.C. following the Federal defeat at Second Manassas. Fitz John Porter, the commander of the Fifth Corps, had a tougher task than most. The Fifth Corps had the distinction of being involved in both the Peninsula and Second Manassas battles, meaning that it had suffered more than its fair share of casualties, sickness, and stragglers in the weeks preceding the Maryland Campaign. Thus, when George McClellan and his staff were attempting to assess Federal strength in early September, the Fifth Corps was a problem. September 1st and 2nd saw McClellan and his staff writing to different commanders inquiring about the strength and composition of their commands. On September 5th, Porter wrote to Seth Williams, Assistant Adjutant General of the Army of the Potomac, informing him that, because of the heavy losses in the officer corps and the disorganized state of the ranks, it would be very difficult to provide any reliable strength numbers for his corps. On the same day that Porter was informing Williams that he couldn't get an estimate of his strength, Stonewall Jackson and thousands of Confederates were crossing over the Potomac River and into Maryland. Thus, McClellan was starting the campaign with a serious disadvantage.

Halls Hill, VA, Sept 5, 1862

Gen. S. Williams

I find it almost impossible to get a report of the strength of the command. Colonels and Adjt Generals and Assistant Adjutant Generals either killed, wounded, sick, or absent. Have destroyed everything. New (books) are employed and records are with the Commands. I have done my best and I must beg you to be patient.

Will send report at the earliest moment.

F.J. Porter,

Major General Comdg.

Many historians use certainty and hindsight to excoriate officers in the past; yet, as Joe Harsh wrote in Taken at the Flood, “Perfect clarity of understanding was impossible, and even reasonable clarity usually came long after decisions had to be rendered.” McClellan would leave Washington with uncertainty in his mind over the strength and condition of his forces. That uncertainty was a result of dispatches like this one.



(Fitz John Porter to Seth Williams, September 5, 1862, George B. McClellan Papers, Box A78, Reel 31, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division) 

Harsh Award Presentation

Yesterday, I presented my research for the Dr. Joseph L. Harsh Memorial Scholar Award at the Save Historic Antietam Foundation Seminar at Antietam Battlefield, and it all went better than I could have ever expected. I had family and friends in attendance, the reception for the research was wonderful, and I got to meet several members of the Harsh family. To all those who helped me out with the research and the project, I can't thank you enough. Specifically, I want to thank Jim Rosebrock, the leader of Antietam Battlefield Guides, who helped me with research at the National Archives, and who also spent lots of time chatting about the project while working the front desk at the Antietam Visitor Center. Also, I need to thank, once again, my colleagues on the ranger staff at Antietam. Rangers Brian Baracz, Keith Snyder, John Hoptak, and Mannie Gentile all talked with me about the project and assisted with advice and comments along the way. Antietam Superintendent Susan Trail was also in attendance yesterday, and I was especially grateful that she was there. We are all very proud to have her leading Antietam into this important week for the 150th this year. Also, Ranger Alann Schmidt approved the joke I used to start the program, which was perhaps the greatest assistance I could have received. Those of you who have the pleasure of knowing Alann understand why this was an essential component to my presentation. The man knows his jokes.

I have to also thank SHAF President Tom Clemens for all of his work putting the event together, as well as his assistance with the project along the way. It couldn't have been done without his help. 

I hope to put some of the research up on the blog over the next few weeks, but as I will be publishing this research in an article, I will limit what I will put on the blog. Stay tuned however, because I think that this is just the start of what could be more research and work on the Army of the Potomac at Antietam, as there are still many myths about the army that need to be erased. If I had to lay out my conclusions in a concise manner, I would say for the sake of brevity, they are as follows:

1. McClellan did not know his own strength at Antietam. In fact, he likely overestimated it.
2. Straggling was just as big a problem for the Union army as it was for the Confederate army in the campaign.
3. Union commanders from McClellan down to corps, division, and brigade command struggled with understanding their strength and getting the army into a condition where it was ready for combat.
4. The Union army and its commanders, specifically brigade commanders, were FAR less experienced that the Confederate army at Antietam.
5. Returns and morning reports, coupled with Ezra Carman's numbers for the army, show that Federal forces dropped considerably throughout the campaign.


I was able to uncover considerable amounts of unpublished material on the army and its commanders in the campaign, as well as the numbers of the army, and I truly hope that the data, letters, and dispatches which I found and used will help to correct the myth that the Federal army at Antietam was an invincible force. In fact, it was a cobbled together army which limped its way north, and the fact that McClellan was able to do what he did with it is utterly remarkable.Stay tuned for pieces of the research to appear on here, as well as for updates on where and when the research will be published.


That will have to do for now. Here are some pictures of the event yesterday, as well as a short video of the award presentation, filmed by Ranger Brian Baracz.

 SHAF President, and great Antietam historian, Tom Clemens presenting me with the Dr. Joseph L. Harsh Memorial Scholar Award

 Dad, Mom, Myself, and my girlfriend Alison

Antietam Superintendent Susan Trail, myself, Rangers Keith Snyder, Brian Baracz, and John Hoptak

Alison and I

Here is the video of the award presentation...

September 7, 1862: "A victory now and we will soon be together"

150 years ago today, Major General George Brinton McClellan moved his headquarters into Rockville, Maryland, officially beginning his move northward into Maryland to pursue Robert E. Lee and the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia. McClellan wrote the following letter to his wife that day:

We are all well and the entire army is now united, cheerful and confident. You need not fear the result for I believe that God will give us the victory. I leave here this afternoon to take command of the troops in the field. The feeling of the Government towards me, I am sure, is kind and trusting. I hope with God's blessing, to justify the great confidence they now repose in me, and will bury the past in oblivion. A victory now and we will soon be together. I send a short letter today. God bless and reward your trust in Him and all will be well.
 

This short post will have to do for today. For those in the area, tomorrow I will be presenting my research on the strength, experience, and condition of the Army of the Potomac at Antietam for the Save Historic Antietam Foundation Seminar at Antietam National Battlefield. If you are in the area, stop on by. The seminar will be at the Mumma Barn, and I will be speaking at 10:45 am.

It is a great time to be at Antietam. Today, the Visitor Center was packed from open to close, we officially opened our new museum gallery, and the phones were ringing off the hook. The 150th is definitely right around the corner!

Edwin V. Sumner to his wife, September 20, 1862: "I think I was never in such a fire as when that division broke"

Here is another recent find from my research in various collections in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress. The below is the transcript of a letter which Major General Edwin V. Sumner, commander of the Second Corps of the Army of the Potomac at Antietam, to his wife three days after Antietam. It is very candid and informal, and he relays his thoughts on the recent battle, as well as Union strategy going forward from Antietam.

My own dear Wife,

The battle is over and we are safe. The enemy has fled from Maryland and I do not think we shall meet them again for some time, for it will take a little time to make preparations before we pursue them. It was a terrific battle. Some generals under my command were wounded. Mansfield was killed early in the action. He had only had command of his Corps two days, that corps (Banks) is under my command and in addition to my own. I did not like the way in which the troops were put into battle. They went in corps after corps instead of being all forward in battle array before we engaged.

On the right Hooker went [forward], and then my second corps under Mansfield and then my own corps. The consequence was that we were not strong enough—Sedgwick was wounded and his division broke and never did I have to make such exertion as I did to rally that division. I succeeded finally and got them again into line and held my position.

The enemy fought like maniacs to give you an idea of it. Nineteen of their men lay dead about a piece of artillery that one of my batteries knocked to pieces.—Two of my staff were wounded. Col. Revere and young (illegible). They have both gone home.

Our dear boy behaved splendidly. He was much more anxious about me than about himself—he was as cool and manly as an old veteran.

Col. Revere left before he knew the fate of his brother the doctor, he was shot through the heart and killed instantly, but it was not known till the next day. I have sent his remains home in charge of an officer. The battle has been unequally fatal to officers, and especially to those of high command. I think I was never in such a fire as when that division broke—I was obliged to shout in such a way that I could not speak loud for some time afterwards—We have been on the field ever since the battle but today I have got the command a little more comfortably fixed, and we are all enjoying the rest.

I don’t know what their plans will be—I think everything we can raise should be pushed upon them at once and grind them to powder—If there should be a pause in the operations I will come home, dear, and rest for I do feel that I need your care and love.

Fatherly love to all

Dear father,

E

(Sumner Family Papers, Box 1, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division)

This letter fascinates me on many different levels. First off, it is a personal note from Sumner to his wife just after the battle, relaying to her his private thoughts on the fighting at Antietam. Seeing his descriptions of his son's conduct in battle is particularly interesting in this regard. For Sumner, escaping combat unscathed was not just about him, but about his son as well. His closing lines about hoping to come home soon for her love and care are particularly moving as well.

In regards to the battle itself, Sumner's letter adds some colorful descriptions of the fighting involving Sedgwick's division in the West Woods. By describing how loud he was yelling when trying to rally the men, the letter provides an excellent personal account of what the West Woods fight was like for the 2nd Corps commander that morning. When over 7,000 Confederate slammed into Sedgwick's left flank, the route was on, and it was all Sumner could do to save himself and attempt to salvage what was left of the division he had led so confidently into the woods just a few moments before.
Also, his comment objecting to the piecemeal manner in which troops were committed that day holds true to his reported impatience on the morning of the 17th. While the 1st and 12th Corps were plunging into battle, Sumner was still at McClellan's headquarters awaiting his go ahead to take his corps across the creek.

Sumner's comments regarding the necessary time it would take to regather the army after the battle are illuminating as well. It highlights the exhausted nature of the men following the fight, something which many armchair general historians too easily forget. I really like his line regarding his desire to "grind them to powder." It certainly displays his firm resolve to end the war and the rebellion sooner rather than later. 

It is also worth making a point of clarification. Sumner writes of having two corps under his command. During the advance of the Army of the Potomac from Washington, Sumner commanded the army's center wing, consisting of his 2nd Corps and the 12th Corps, formerly the 2nd Corps of the Army of Virginia, previously commanded by Nathaniel Banks (the corps formally switched its designation on September 12). The right wing consisted of the 1st and 9th Corps, and was commanded by Ambrose Burnside, and the left wing consisted of the 6th Corps and Darius Couch's 4th Corps division, and was commanded by William B. Franklin. By the time the army reached the banks of Antietam Creek, this three wing formation was all but dead: the 1st and 9th Corps were on opposite ends of the battlefield, and on the night of the 16th, the 12th Corps was sent across the creek without its 2nd Corps counterpart for the center wing. Indeed, at the start of the battle, only Franklin's wing of the army was still together, being located several miles away in Pleasant Valley. Thus, despite demise of the three wing command by the time the opening guns were firing at Antietam, Sumner was still writing as though he was still the commander of the center wing of the army (both his 2nd Corps and the 12th Corps) three days after the battle.

Captain George A. Custer to Major General George B. McClellan, September 15, 1862

Over the past few weeks, on days when I am not working at the park, you can most likely find me in Washington, at either the National Archives or the Library of Congress, digging through rolls of microfilm and dusty old record books, working away on my ongoing research regarding the strength, experience, and composition of the Army of the Potomac at Antietam. The McClellan Papers at the Library of Congress have turned out to be very, very interesting. While Stephen Sears published a collection of McClellan's Civil War correspondence years ago, the collection only scratches the surface of what can be found in the Library of Congress holdings. Thus far, I have mostly been digging through rolls and rolls of correspondence on microfilm, primarily things that were sent to McClellan before and during the campaign. Some of this material can be found in the Official Record volumes relating to Antietam (and the supplemental volume as well). Yet, much of it is unpublished reports and dispatches. For an excellent example, I have below a dispatch sent to McClellan by a young Captain by the name of George Armstrong Custer (sound familiar?) Custer was serving on McClellan's staff during the Maryland Campaign, and on September 15, the day after the Battle of South Mountain, Custer sent a message to McClellan describing for him Lee's positions outside of Sharpsburg. The time on this dispatch appears to be 1 p.m., meaning that this message is a firsthand account of Lee's battle lines by Custer, who was apparently one of the first Union officers to survey the positions along Antietam Creek.

The enemy is drawn up in line of battle on a ridge about two miles beyond Potomac [.] They are in full view [.] Their line is a perfect one about a mile and a half long. We have can have equally good position as they now occupy. Richardson is forming his line to attack. We are lacking in artillery Tidball’s being the only artillery available hurry up more guns we can get good position for two hundred guns. Longstreet is in command and has forty cannon that we know of. We can employ all the troops you can send us.
Custer

Library of Congress, George B. McClellan Papers (A80: Roll 32)

In the McClellan Papers, this dispatch is dated September 17, 1862. Yet, because of its content and the other dispatches which Custer sent McClellan that day (at least from those I saw in the McClellan Papers thus far), this must have been on the 15th, and whomever cataloged the papers simply mislabeled it. The mention of Tidball's Battery, Richardson's Division, and the defensive positions of Lee's army outside of Sharpsburg all suggest that this was a dispatch sent on the 15th, making it an early assessment of the Confederate position outside of Sharpsburg.


In the Sears collection of McClellan's Civil War correspondence, a reference is made to this dispatch in a footnote where Sears only included the following portion: "The enemy is drawn up in line of battle on a ridge about two miles beyond [Keedysville]. They are in full view. Their line is a perfect one about a mile and a half long.... Longstreet is in command and has forty cannon that we know of." Sears omitted the lines where Custer notes the lack of Federal artillery at the front, as well as the mention of Tidball’s battery and Richardson’s division. It should be noted that, while Custer's dispatch clearly says Lee is two miles beyond the Potomac, he was either mistaken or confused in his wording. As Sears indicated in his reference to this dispatch, Custer meant that Lee was two miles beyond Keedysville, not the Potomac River. On the 15th, Lee was indeed two miles beyond Keedysville, drawn up outside of Sharpsburg. If Custer did indeed mean the Potomac, then using beyond was a poor word choice, as it suggests that Lee's army was past the river, rather than a few miles away from it, still on Maryland soil. However, given the lack of punctuation and the hurried nature of the writing, I doubt Custer took a moment to proofread the message he was sending along. Either way, it is a fascinating dispatch from an officer who would go on to be one of the more famous generals of the war, and of the 19th century, offering one of the first Union assessments of Lee’s position outside of Sharpsburg.