Our Country's Fiery Ordeal

A blog about the American Civil War, written and maintained by historian Daniel J. Vermilya, author of The Battle of Kennesaw Mountain (History Press, 2014) and James Garfield and the Civil War (History Press, 2015)

Dedicated to my great-great-great grandfather, Private Ellwood Rodebaugh, Company D, 106th Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry, killed at the Battle of Antietam, September 17, 1862.

"And may an Overuling Providence continue to cause good to come out of evil, justice to be done to all men where injustice has long prevailed, and finally, peace, quiet, and harmony to come out of this terrible confrontation and our country's fiery ordeal." -- Albert Champlin, 105th Ohio, Diary entry of June 19, 1864 (Western Reserve Historical Society)

Showing posts with label Tidball Trail. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Tidball Trail. Show all posts

Tuesday, April 24, 2012

Captain John C. Tidball at Antietam

Last year, Antietam National Battlefield opened the Tidball Trail, covering some of the ground near the Middle Bridge where elements of the 5th Corps and the U.S. Cavalry and their respective artillery batteries engaged with the center of Lee's line along the Boonsboro Pike (Route 34).


In the course of my research on the Army of the Potomac at Antietam, I have been reading some great accounts from veterans regarding the effectiveness of various army units, as well as other topics such as experience, strength, and battle readiness. One of those sources is John C. Tidball's The Artillery Service in the War of the Rebellion, 1861-1865. Adapted from a series of articles written by Tidball from 1891 to 1893 in the Journal of Military Service Institution and edited by Lawrence Kaplan, this is a fine work for anyone doing a study on artillery service and effectiveness during the Civil War. Tidball writes about many of the main battles in which he participated in the East, and he also discusses a few of the battles in the West, such as Shiloh, Chickamauga, and Stones' River.



Captain John C. Tidball

Because I was at the park to do some research today, and because I am reading Tidball's work right now, I stopped by the Tidball trail for some photos this afternoon. The park recently completed an artillery relocation, where our excellent staff placed some artillery guns at new locations. One of these locations, and in my opinion one of the finest spots on the park for artillery guns, is the Tidball trail, where two three inch ordinance rifles were recently placed. I wanted to check out the new views from the trail, and the new guns did not disappoint.




At Antietam, John C. Tidball was the Captain of Battery A, 2nd US Artillery. A West Point graduate from 1848, Tidball was an experienced officer whose actions at the battle helped to support infantry attacks on the Federal right and left. His guns were positioned on a ridge line just west of Antietam Creek, having a view of the center and southern end of the battlefield. 


In his account of Antietam, Tidball writes that Union artillery units were not as well organized as were their Confederate counterparts. Confederate batteries were largely organized into battalions, allowing for greater concentration of firepower on certain parts of the field (think of the Stephen D. Lee Battalion in between the Dunker Church and the current site of the Visitor Center). Conversely, Federal batteries were largely on their own, attached to various brigades or divisions. This dispersed Federal firepower for field artillery west of the Antietam, limiting the ability of Union artillery to support infantry attacks with close range support.



(Tidball's battery looking west toward Confederate positions on northern side of Boonsboro Pike)

Tidball's description of the fighting in the Cornfield and West Woods is critical of Hooker's use of his artillery. He suggests that Federal artillery was underutilized because of the lack of general coordination between various divisions and corps in their attacks. He also provides a chilling quote describing the fighting in that sector: "No other equal area upon the American continent has been so drenched with human blood." (79)



 Tidball's view of Cemetery Hill, on the southern (left) side of Route 34.

Throughout the battle, Union artillery on the eastern banks of the Antietam pelted Confederate forces with long range fire. To support these long range batteries, Union cavalry and batteries attached to the cavalry were sent across the Middle Bridge to fire on the center of the Confederate line. One of these batteries was Tidball's Battery A, 2nd US Artillery:

"To silence these batteries [Federal guns on the east bank of the Antietam] Lee directed his chief of artillery to post his most powerful batteries along the crest in front of Sharpsburg, but before this could be effected the four horse batteries of Pleasanton's cavalry pushed across the center bridge, and amid a shower of shot, shell, and musketry, took position on an intermediate crest between Lee's line and the batteries on the opposite side of the Antietam. The fire from the 24 pieces of these horse batteries was so spirited as not only to prevent the establishment of other batteries in their front, but to drive away those already there... The horse batteries continued to hold the position until withdrawn at dark. In addition to attending to their immediate front they, as occasion offered, directed their fire to the right upon Jackson's masses and to the left upon the troops confronting Burnside." (72)





Tidball's six guns fired over 1,200 shells from this position. In this photograph, the southern part of the battlefield can be seen. Not only could Tidball support Fifth Corps infantry and U.S. Cavalry near the Middle Bridge and 2nd Corps infantry attacking the Sunken Road, but he could support Burnside's right flank, advancing across the fields in the distance on the left side of the above photograph.



Hawkin's Zouaves monument, as seen from Tidball's position.


Tidball went on to become one of the most successful Union artillery officers of the war. He was brevetted for gallantry five times, becoming a Brevet Major General by the end of the war. During his post Civil War career, he was the Superintendent of Artillery instruction at the army's Artillery School, eventually achieving the rank of  Colonel in the regular army. His thoughts and observations on artillery throughout the conflict stand the test of time in their wisdom and insight to important artillery operations at battles such as Antietam. While I disagree with some of his judgments regarding the generalship of the battle, I believe that the quote below is particularly astute in reminding us of the good reasons for caution which were in the back of McClellan's mind during the battle. Even if one says that Antietam was a draw, the simple fact is that for Lee and his invading army, it was ultimately a defeat.

"But McClellan was cautious, perhaps over cautious. Nothing but his army stood between Lee and the National capital. A decided repulse would be an immeasurable misfortune and there was no certainty that he could fight his army better on any other day than he had on the 17th... [Antietam] was in reality a drawn battle. But a drawn battle to an invading army is little less than defeat." (86-7)

Tidball, John C. The Artillery Service in the War of the Rebellion, 1861-1865. Edited by Lawrence M. Kaplan (Yardley, Pennsylvania: Westholme Publishing, 2011)


Tuesday, August 16, 2011

The Tidball Trail at Antietam National Battlefield

One of the greatest truths about studying military history is that to really understand how battles were fought, one has to understand the battlefield itself. Perhaps the most important part of understanding a battlefield is its terrain, and there is no better way to gain a sense of what the terrain of a place is like other than to walk or hike it. Antietam is a perfect place for this because of the many trails throughout the park which are not only wonderful for their natural beauty, but also offer tremendous value for the historian as well. It is impossible to understand Burnside's Final Attack against Lee's lines, and A.P. Hill's subsequent flanking movement, without spending time on the Final Attack trail. Likewise, without walking the Bloody Lane Trail, one cannot profess an intimate knowledge of how Union soldiers advanced against the Sunken Road.


This past week, another trail has been added to Antietam's list. The Tidball trail, a .3 mile walk out to a ridge line overlooking the central portions of the battlefield, offers visitors unique new perspectives and opportunities to learn about little understood aspects of Antietam. The trail ends at the position held by John C. Tidball's battery of artillery, and it offers some of the best views in the entire park. For most visitors and historians, the Union 5th Corps and Cavalry played no role whatsoever in the battle. Many are shocked to learn that more casualties occurred at the Middle Bridge than at the more famous Burnside Bridge. Hopefully, the Tidball Trail will help to fix some of the lapses in our historical understanding of the Middle Bridge at Antietam.


John C. Tidball commanded Battery A, 2nd US Artillery and was attached to Pleasanton's Cavalry Division, which advanced across the Middle Bridge with Sykes's U.S. Regulars of the 5th Corps, to press against Lee's center along the Boonsboro Turnpike. McClellan's battle plan had initially called for attacks with the Union right and left flanks on the northern and southern ends of Lee's lines, with a possible crushing blow to be launched across the Middle Bridge against Lee's center. As the battle raged and progressed, time after time, Confederate flanking attacks seemingly appeared out of nowhere, suggested to McClellan that Lee outnumbered the Union forces. 5th Corps commander Fitz-John Porter advised McClellan against launching an attack with his corps, as it was the only reserve left to guard the Boonsboro Turnpike, a road which was the first of many on a long path towards Washington D.C. and victory for the Confederates, should they have defeated the Union forces at Antietam.


While McClellan never launched a full scale attack at the Middle Bridge, a decision which is highly controversial, the fact of the matter is that the 5th Corps was indeed engaged in some capacity at Antietam, belying the false notions put forward by some that as many as 30,000 Union soldiers sat idly by while their comrades were slaughtered without support. Understanding the battle through such misconceptions not only clouds our historical judgments on McClellan's generalship, but it also diminishes the sacrifices made by those 600 soldiers who were casualties in the fighting near the Middle Bridge. Ignoring this action is just as historically irresponsible as is ignoring the 5th Corps' contributions in attacking Lee's rear guard at Shepherdstown on the 19th and 20th of September.


A few days ago I ventured out to this new trail before heading in to the Visitor Center. The views of the battlefield from this trail are incredible.




















A few weeks ago, while at Manassas for the 150th, a visitor began discussing with me the scenarios in which McClellan could have "won" at Antietam. Among the possible actions this gentleman suggested was a strike by the 5th Corps at Antietam. Needless to say, he was shocked to learn that these troops were indeed engaged during the battle. Now, thanks to the hardworking staff at Antietam, a new trail can help to tell this overlooked story.